

Distributed Big Data Assets Sharing & Processing

Trusted Data Processing in Untrusted Environments.

C. de Laat (moderator), L. Gommans, R. Wilson

System & Network Engineering, University of Amsterdam

AirFrance KLM

CIENA



2017




April 23-26

Washington DC



Fading Trust in Internet




Main problem statement


- Organizations that normally compete have to bring data together to achieve a common goal!
- The shared data may be used for that goal but not for any other!
- Data may have to be processed in untrusted data centers.
 - How to enforce that using modern Cyber Infrastructure?
 - How to organize such alliances?
 - How to translate from strategic via tactical to operational level?
 - What are the different fundamental data infrastructure models to consider?





Secure Policy Enforced Data Processing



- Bringing data and processing software from competing organisations together for common goal
- Docker with encryption, policy engine, certs/keys, blockchain and secure networking
- Data Docker (virtual encrypted hard drive)
- Compute Docker (protected application, signed algorithms)
- Visualization Docker (to visualize output)



Ambition to put capabilities into fieldlab



Re-enforcing ICT preconditions:
Each envisaged site has similar elements



Program:

15h00 Cees de Laat, University of Amsterdam

Trusted Data Processing in Untrusted Environments.

15h05 Leon Gommans, Air France KLM

Trusted Big Data Sharing.

15h25 Rodney Wilson

Programmable Supernetworks, Science DMZ based Networking.

15h30 Panel of stakeholders Flash talks (~3 min each):

Inder Monga - ESnet - Data Science Driving Discovery.

Matt Zekauskas - Internet2 - Thoughts on Internet2 and Trusted Large Data Transfer.

Jerry Sobieski - NORDUnet - Issues of Big Data Sharing in a Global Science Collaboration.

Adam Slagell - NCSA - What are we trusting?

15h45 Panel discussion moderated by Cees de Laat

16h00 End of session.



INTERNET²

2017 global
SUMMIT

TRUSTED BIG DATA ASSET SHARING

Leon Gommans

Science Officer, Air France KLM Group IT Technology Office

Guest Researcher, University of Amsterdam

AIR FRANCE KLM



System and Network Engineering

BRINGING
NETWORKS
TOGETHER

2017

CONTENT

- Sharing Big Data Assets and Trust
- Secure Digital Market Place concept
- Infrastructure model research
- Research project involvement.



Sharing Big Data Assets within a group needs



Clearly defined and agreed common **benefit** defining the group's identity



Common group rules governing use, access and benefit sharing.



Organizing trust amongst group members as **means to reduce risk**



Infrastructure supporting **implementation of trust** whilst ensuring **autonomy**



Trust as a means to reduce risk

Risk:

- Compliance
- Liability
- Disclosure
- Ownership
- Intellectual Property
- Additional oversight
- etc., etc...




Means:

Trust and **power** are both means capable of reducing risk


How to organize trust and power? -> **The Secure Digital Market Place concept**



The Secure Digital Market Place: A high level framework




Traditional Model raising concerns




Domain =
Autonomous
Organization
with own
administration and
enforcement

Alternative: bring processing to the data



An innovative deployment model: separate processing from data




Data Transfer Node enables utilization of available high network bandwidth across distance


DTN is part of Science DMZ concept from



Secure Digital Market Place deployment model research testbed





Global Digital Market Place Testbed via the GLIF?



Pacific Research Platform testbed involvement

Research goal:
Explore value of academic network research capabilities that enable innovative ways & models to share big data assets



Data Transfer Node at KLM fieldlab with 100 gb/s link to enable SDMP research thanks to UvA, SURFnet and Ciena

Note: this diagram represents a subset of sites and connections.

v1.16 - 20151019




Big Data Sharing use cases placed in airline context



Global Scale



Aircraft Component Health Monitoring (Big) Data
NWO **CIMPLO** project
4.5 FTE



National Scale



Cargo Logistics Data
NLIP **iShare** project



Cybersecurity Big Data
NWO **COMMIT/SARNET** project
3.5 FTE



City / regional Scale



Campus / Enterprise Scale





2017 global SUMMIT



AIR FRANCE KLM

SE System and Network Engineering

Thank you !

NL Research funded by **NWO, STW, COMMIT/, Commit2Data, NLIP**
in collaboration with **Internet2, ESnet, PRP, NCSA, ANL, ICAIR,..**

University of Amsterdam: Cees de Laat, Tom van Engers, Paola Grosso,
Amenah Deljoo, Gleb Polevoy, Ralph Koning, Ben de Graaff, Lukasz Makovski

Ciena: Steve Alexander, Rodney Wilson, Marc Lyonais, Lance Williford

SURFnet: Erik Huizer, Gerben van Malenstijn

SURFsara: Anwar Osseyran, Axel Berg

Leiden University: Thomas Baeck, Jeroen van der Leijé

TNO: Rob Meijer, Frank Franssen, Jan Burgmeijer, Jan Wester

CWI: Marc Stevens

Air France KLM: Edwin Borst, Nicolas Forgues, Vincent Euzeby, Bart Krol, Wouter Kalfsbeek

NLIP / iShare Michiel Haarman, Vincent Janssen, Gijs Burgers

BRINGING
NETWORKS
TOGETHER

17



Programmable Supernetworks, Science DMZ based Networking

Rodney G. Wilson
Sr. Director, External Research Programs
CTO - Ciena


Industry Interests

Issues in moving large dataflows


We have issues with trust & security

Tomorrow's problems today

Putting theory in to practice...



Field lab



CENI "client resource"


NFV Engines

DMZ vs. lockdown

- 8700 Packet Wave Platform**
- 4 Slot with 560G of L2 Capacity
 - 4x40G (2 PSLM-200-2)
 - 2x100G (1 PSLM-200-2)
 - 20x10GE (1 PSLM-200-20)


CENI Ottawa System Specifications

- 14 Dell Servers
 - 180 Physical Cores -> approx. 330 Virtual Core Machines Running Linux RedHAT 6.0
 - Up to ~ 80 VMs (using 4 Cores each.)
 - 608 GB of Physical RAM -> approx. 1.2TB VRAM
 - 6 TB of HD-> more than 12TB Virtual Disk Capacity
- 100GE Upload Capacity, first of its kind for GENI
- 20GE in Management Ethernet ports (approx 48 ports) via 5142 and 5150)
- All DC powered (approx. 100A)
- 175 Public IP addresses on CANARIE Network



ciena			
DATE	7/10/2014	VERSION	1
		PAGE	1
ENGINEER	Marc Lyonnais		PROJECT ID
DOCUMENT	Exo Geni Rack Elevation		
PROJECT	GENI		
NETWORK SITE	Ottawa		

Field Lab Architecture



ciena			
DATE	VERSION	PAGE	
2/5/2015	8	1	
ENGINEER	PROJECT ID		
DOCUMENT	Marc Lyonnais		

Data Science Driving Discovery

ESnet

Inder Monga

Director, ESnet

Division Director, Scientific Networking

Lawrence Berkeley National Lab



Rapid increase in data rates and number of data sources

large experimental facilities ...



- Complexity of scientific discovery increasing
- Data volumes are increasing > Moore's Law
- Fewer large facilities, but global scientific population


Automated coupling of **compute and storage with networks** critical to increasing science productivity

..and smaller, new data sources.




LCLS to NERSC – ECP ExaFEL project

Providing atomic scale vision to researchers at beamline in < 10min



Superfacility: Integrated network of experimental and computational facilities and expertise





Thoughts on Internet2 – Big Data Panel

Matt Zekauskas
matt@internet2.edu



Thoughts on Internet2 and Trusted Large Data Transfer

- Internet2 builds a network to support these sort of big data transfers, connecting our regional networks, schools and service providers
- We can build custom paths, dynamically, to support communication among trusted partners
- The Internet2 community has also worked in trust and identity, creating the inCommon trust fabric, and the TIER program. Leverage this to help create bilateral trust between entities
- Internet2 is involved with the Pacific Research Platform partners toward creating a national research platform, including “standards” for data transfer nodes – an opportunity to improve trusted big data flows
 - A way to collaboratively negotiate and articulate trust and thus access
 - Blend policy and social to reduce friction to discover and negotiate
- Increase transparency – telemetry – to foster trust?

Issues of Big Data Sharing in a Global Science Collaboration

**Is it networking issue?
Or is it a security issue?**

Jerry Sobieski
Chief Research Officer
NORDUnet

Presented to the Internet2 Global Summit 2017

Sharing large data assets

- Redistributing and correlating large data has two major challenges:
 - Moving large data sets across large physical distances -> The classic network capacity/performance issue (This assumes the two locations are trusted)
 - Secured access to information – once outside a secure perimeter, there is no longer effective control of access to that info. (i.e. how do we “trust” remote locations?)
- Moving the algorithm to the data:
 - Useful where the distributed data sets are already integrated in a single “location”
 - Does not solve the problem of gathering distributed data sets for correlation or other integrated analysis algorithms,
- Exposes the algorithm to potential security breaches
 - Proprietary algorithms may be compromised

- Jurisdictional restrictions
 - (E.g. national borders)
- Proprietary restrictions
 - e.g. business policy, IP algorithms
- Privacy restrictions
 - E.g. personal financial info, medical data, etc.
- Trust – but verify
 - Verifiably compliance – can we authorize each access of information? Or limit the use to a single trusted agent?
- Provenance – how do we handle provenance / reproducibility where data access is secured or constrained?

- “Virtualization” poses important challenges
 - The physical location of information is no longer determined
 - What constitutes a secure (trusted) perimeter in virtual service environments?
- “Cloud” services have not solved the security problem:
 - We can store encrypted data
 - We can transport encrypted data
 - We cannot [yet?] compute on encrypted data (homomorphic computing)
 - This exposes data in the clear

Key open questions:

- Can we *verifiably* secure computational processes short of physical secure perimeters?
 - Security thru obscurity? Distributed computation, interchangeable algorithmic components,
 - Who verifies and signs “trusted” code – can we trust them? -> trusted security services who’s business value proposition is their reliability in terms of security analysis of components.
 - Homomorphic (encrypted) computing?
- We can authorize access to information, but having authorized access to some agent, we lose control over the information because that info is now in the clear..
 - Can we encrypt and “sign” data in such a way that only authorized agent(s) can interpret the data and make use of it?

NATIONAL CENTER FOR SUPERCOMPUTING APPLICATIONS

2017 Internet2 Global Summit *Panel on Big Data Sharing*

Adam Slagell



What are we trusting?

- Trusting not to re-share?
- Trusting to act competently?
- Trusting our common incentives and aligned interests?
- Trusting algorithms and expertise?
 - Requires deep understanding of the problem, right semantics for policies
 - Does not often generalize



What needs to be shared?

- Analysis can happen at many layers
 - REN-ISAC members share derived data, not raw
- Can we do non-consumptive analysis?
 - Depends on the problem space
- Sharing publicly very hard
 - Understand the limits of anonymization
- Start simple
 - One well-defined problem

